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Renvoi has been burned at the stake many times by the very
ablest writers in the field of private international law. Yet, Phoenixlike it always arises from the ashes of its own holocaust. The continued existence of the doctrine should make one suspect that renvoi
fills a vital practical need in the field of the conflict of laws. 2 In fact
it reconciles two contradictory principles of decision. The one is the
conflict of laws rule which directs the court under certain general circumstances to apply foreign law. The other is the intuitive conviction
of the judge that in the special circumstances of the renvoi case before
him the ends of justice will be served just as well, if not better, by the
application of the familiar law of the forum rather than the unfamiliar
law of a foreign jurisdiction. Whether legitimate or not, renvoi is a
device which permits both of these contradictory needs to be satisfied.
Renvoi has in the past occasioned little concern to American
writers. Although potentially applicable on a vast scale to problems
of conflicts in the laws of the various states of the Union, 3 renvoi in
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I. The basis for the doctrine of renvoi was laid by the French Court of Cassation
in the famous Forgo case, Administration des Domaines contra Ditchl et autres,
Cour de Cassation, June 24, 1878, Dalloz Recueil de Jurisprudence, 1879 I. 56; Sirey,
1882 I. 393. Forgo, a natural child, born Bavarian, died intestate at Pau leaving movable property in France. By the Bavarian law, collateral relatives had a claim. Under
the Code Napoleon, these relatives were excluded. Inasmuch as Forgo had not obtained
authorization to establish his domicile in France, French law referred the court to
Bavarian law for rules governing the distribution of the estate. According to Bavarian
law, on the other hand, questions of intestate succession were determined by the lex
situs of the property, i. e., the law of France. The court held that French law was
applicable, thus "accepting the renvoi" from the Bavarian law. Theoretical discussion
appears to have been started by an article of Labb6 entitled, Du Conflit entre [a Loi Nationale du Juge Saisi et utne Loi Etrang~reRelativement a la Determination de la Loi
Applicable i la Cause (1885) 12 CLUNET 5. A complete history of the Forgo case is
given by Philonenko, L'Affaire Forgo (1932) 59 CLUNEr 281.
Throughout this article, JOURNAL Du DROIr INTERNATIONAL PRIvA will be referred
to as CLuNET; the REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRnrv and its continuation, the
REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL as DARRAS; the ZEITScnRiFT FOR INTERNATIONALES PRIVAT UND STRAFRECHT as NIEMEYER; and JHERINGS JAHRBOCHER FOR
DIE DOGMATIK DES BURGERLICHEN RECHTS as JHERINGS JAHRBRiCHER.

2. The American Law Institute accepts the doctrine of renvoi as governing questions of title to land and those concerning the validity of divorce. RESTATEmENT, CONFLIcT OF LAWS (1934)

§ 8.

3. Professor Philonenko, in a recent very careful study, is struck by the fact that
renvoi plays such an important part in the law of so many countries. He concludes
that this cannot be the result of coincidence, but on the contrary is evidence of the
operation of a general legal principle. LA THEoRIE Du RENvoi EN DROIT ComPARL
(1935). See the recent case of University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270
N. W. 175 (1936), where the court in effect applies the renvoi doctrine without mentioning it. The case is commented on by Thompson, Conflict of Laws-Renvoi Theor3
-Conflicts Restatement (1937) 35 MIcH. L. REV. 1299, and noted in (937) 21 MINN.
L. REV. 739. This case really turns on a point of qualifications. The doctrine of renvoi
(34)

RENVOI DOES NOT INVOLVE A LOGICAL FALLACY

fact has received in this country only a modicum of the attention which
is paid to it in England and on the Continent. Under the influence of
the masterly attacks on the doctrine by Professor Lorenzen, 4 aided by
the tremendous authority of Professor Beale, 5 the American writers
seem, save for a recent break, unanimously agreed that renvoi is "no
part of the Conflict of Laws of the United States".6
The break referred to is Professor Griswold's recent article entitled "Renvoi Revisited". 7 In it Professor Griswold very definitely
departs from the American tradition and accepts that form of the doctrine of renvoi which is actually applied by the English courts. This
stand reopens an issue confidently regarded as closed by most American
authorities on the conflict of laws," and it will doubtless serve to provoke discussion in this country on the troublesome and obscure subject
of renvoi. It likewise renders timely the present writer's thesis that
renvoi does not involve a logical fallacy. In "Renvoi Revisited", the
learned writer concedes that fallacy to be at least a "remote possibility" 9
when renvoi is accepted. He thus limits the application of the doctrine
to those cases where the fallacy is not a "possibility" and lays himself
open to attack on the ground that the possibility of fallacy is not so
"remote" as he would like to believe.
did not develop in connection with a conflict of qualifications. See Lorenzen, The
Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws (1920) 20 CoL L. REv. 247. Yet
renvoi is a possibility whenever conflict of a choice of law exists. It is not restricted to
a conflict of the law by which a case is to be finally adjudicated. In questions of status
such as domicile, for example, there can well be a conflict of rules for determining when
the status exists. The American rule may ascertain the fact of domicile by residence,
and a foreign law by nationality. It is quite possible for renvoi to be applicable to this
problem. Thereafter, if and when the fact of domicile is made out, a further problem
remains. That is, having determined domicile, which law should be applied to dispose
of the case? Hence, the terrifying possibility exists, in contemplation at least, of two
renvoi situations arising in the same case. Fortunately, from the point of view of
logic, there is no greater difficulty in dealing with two renvoi situations in one case
than with one renvoi situation in two cases. The first is more complex, to be sure,
but the complexity is legal and not logical. Professors Cheatham, Dowling and Goodrich draw attention to the question by asking, "What is the relation of the problem of
renvoi to the problem of classification?" CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CONFLICT
or LAWS (1936) 648. For a collection of references on the problem of qualifications
see LORENzEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed. 1937) 46,

n. 51, and in particular, Bartin, De l'Inpossibilitgd'Arriver a la Suppression Difinitive
des Conflits de Lois (0897) 24 CLUNEr 225, 466. See also Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1937) 53 L. Q. REV. 235, 537; Conflict of Laws: Exampies of Characterization (1937) 15 CAN. B. REV. 215; Niboyet, Froland, Les Conflits de Qualifications et la Question dit Renvoi (1926) 21 DARRAs I. When the
members of the bar become aware of the possibilities of applying renvoi to qualifications such as was done in effect in the Dater case, we may expect the problem to be
presented in much general litigation involving the conflict of laws of the various states.
4. The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law (i9io) ioCOL. L. REV.
190, 327; The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The Law of a
Country" (i918) 27 YALE L. J. 509.
5.Coiu'LicT OF LAWS (1935) § 7.3; RESTATEMENT, CONFLicT OF LAWS (934) § 7.
6. Lorenzen, supra note 4, IO COL. L. REv. at 344. For a complete discussion of
this concert of opinion, see Griswold, Renvoi Revisited (1938) 5I HARv. L. REv. 1165,
pt. Il.
7. Griswold, loc. cit. supra note 6.
8. See infra note 16.

9.Griswold, supra note 6, at 1193.
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The doctrine of renvoi necessitates reference and counter-reference
between the law of the forum and foreign law. From this there has
arisen an assumption universally accepted by writers on the conflict of
laws that such reference and counter-reference lead inescapably to some
form of logical fallacy, 10 whether a vicious circle, or an endless series
of cross-declinations of jurisdiction, or an infinite regress of definitions," or an indefinite postponement of choice of the law by which the
subject matter of the litigation is to be governed.
Those few writers who favor renvoi recognize the force of such
opinion. In meeting it they strive either to minimize the importance
of the supposed fallacy 12 or else to invent expedients to circumvent
it.1 3

Those who oppose renvoi naturally make much of the insecurity

of its logical foundations. 1 4 Logic is given by them as one, but by
no means the only, reason why renvoi should be rejected as a general
theory.
If it should be discovered, therefore, that the assumption that
renvoi involves a vicious circle is without foundation, both the proponents and the opponents of the doctrine will be affected. The net
result of this new position, if it is established, will be the elimination
of the vicious circle argument from the field of controversy. The acceptance or rejection of renvoi must then be decided on juridical, not on
logistic, grounds.
The writer expresses at this time no opinion on the merits of renvoi
as a solution of those problems in the conflict of laws to which it has
Io. Reference here would be to well-nigh the entire body of theoretical literature
on the subject of renvoi. I have come upon no writer who has denied that in one form
or another renvoi leads to some sort of fallacy.
ii. "From the logical point of view it is apparently not an instance of circular reasoning, but rather of a regression." Griswold, supra note 6, at 1167, n. 8.
12. "So we see, that by approaching the matter from the abstract and theoretical
point of view, the fear of the endless chain has been magnified into a generalization;
while the endless chain is in fact and in practice an extremely rare apparition. Doubtless, we cannot leave this discussion without conceding that it may sometime appear.
What will we do if we refer a question to the law of some other state and that state in
turn refers it back to us and tells us that it will dispose of it as we do? One is tempted
to follow the common-law tradition and say that it will be time enough to dispose of that
question when it really arises. . . . In any event, the important thing to bear in
mind is that the endless chain is a remote possibility, not the central theme of renvoi,
and the possibility of its appearance should not be allowed to distort the law in the
many cases where it is not present." Griswold, supra note 6, at 1192-93.
13. Westlake and von Bar, who favor the result attained by renvoi, seem to have
agreed that infinite recurrence could not be escaped after the first reference. In order
to avoid the vicious circle, they devised the ingenious hypothesis known as the theory
of d6sistement, which supposes a mutual disclaimer of jurisdiction by both courts. The
result is the application of the internal law of the forum. WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1925) 30-31; Von Bar (19oo) 18 ANNUAIRE DE I'INSTITUT DE
DRoiT INTERNATIONAL 41, I$3 et seq. For a detailed criticism of this theory, see
Lorenzen, supra note 4, 27 YALE L. J. at 512-518; Schreiber, The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law (918) 31 HARv. L. RExV. 523, 529-32.
14. The following is a good example of this type of argument against renvoi. "(a)
It is illogical. No logical reason can be given why if in the one case . . . Massachusetts law be taken to refer to the French conflict-of-laws rule, the latter should not
in turn be held to refer back again to the Massachusetts conflict-of-laws rule, and so on
ad infinitum; . . ." Schreiber, id. at 533.
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been applied. It so happens, to be sure, that if the doctrine be purged
of logical fallacy those who favor it gain. Yet from the viewpoint of
analysis, this result is accidental, and commits the writer to no stand
on the merits of the doctrine. Trouble enough remains for the proponents of renvoi even though they be relieved of the onus of paradox.
Renvoi '
Let us consider for a moment the following familiar hypothetical
case which will serve as the basis of our discussion. Smith, an Americar citizen, dies in France leaving movable property in New York. At
the time of his death, Smith was domiciled in France according to the
law of New York but not according to the law of France. The law
of New York directs the distribution of movables in accordance with
the law of the domicile of the deceased. French law directs such distribution according to the law of the nationality of the deceased. The
New York court is seised of the case.
It is apparent that the above case involves at least two types of
law. i. The rule of conflict of laws which determines as a preliminary
matter the choice of law by which distribution should be effected. This
we shall call for convenience the conflicts rule. 2. The municipal or
internal rules of law directing the actual distribution of the property.
This we shall call the internal law.
A court faced with a case involving French and American conflicts rules and internal law has a choice of three ways to combine them.
I do not intend to have it inferred that an actual case may not involve
more than three possibilities of choice. I mean that in the hypothetical
case set forth, together with as much law as I have indicated is relevant,
at least these three possible ways of proceeding exist:
i.

The judge may decide that the American conflicts rule refers
him solely to French internal law. This is the position accepted
by many French writers, by some English writers, and so far
16
as I know, by all American authorities but one.

15. Throughout this article, the term renvoi is restricted to mean reference back or
"remission" from one system of law to another. Notice will be taken of what has been
called "transmission" (Weiterverweisung) from one system of law to another, thence to
a third, only at the end of the article. See Bates, Remission and Transmission in
American Conflict of Laws (1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 311; Schreiber, supra note 13, at 525.
I6. At the meetings of the Institute of International Law held in 1898 and 19oo,
the doctrine of renvoi was proposed and rejected. See (1897) 16 ANNUAIRE DE IINSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 47; (1898) 17 id. 14, 22; (igoo) IS id. 34, 145. The
period witnessed a flood of literature on the subject of renvoi, most of it hostile to the
doctrine. See Bartin, Les Conflits entre DispositionsLigislatives de Droit International
Priv (898) 30 REvuE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (,er sfrie) 129, 272; Von Bar, Die
Riickverweisung im internationalenPrivatrecht (1898) 8 NIEMEYER 177; Asser, La
Question du Renvoi devant [a Trosi~me Conf!rence de Droit International Privi (igoo)
2 REVUE DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL ( 2 e sdrie) 316; Fiore, Du Conflit entre les Dispositions Ligislatives de Droit InternationalPriv, (I9o) 28 CLUNET 424; Buzzati, Die
Frage der Riickverweisung vor dern "Institut de Droit International" (19o2) II NitXEYER 3; LigeoLx, La Thiorie du Renvoi et la Nature Juridique des Rgles de Droit
InternationalPrivi (9o3) 30 CLuNET 481; Asser, Quelques Observations Concernant
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The judge may decide that the American conflicts rule refers
him to the French conflicts rule which, in turn, refers him
solely to the American internal law. This is the doctrine of
renvoi in its most usual form. It is the position steadfastly
adhered to by the French Court of Cassation, 17 is the view
approved by certain English writers of note 18 and by a few
Continental writers of importance.' 9 It is part of the statutory
law of Germany.2 °
3. Lastly, the judge may decide that the American conflicts rule
refers him solely to the French conflicts rule which, in turn,
refers him solely to the American conflicts rule. This results
in a circulus inextricabilis since it indicates an infinite num2
ber of cross references. '
2.

la ThMorie ou le Syst~tne du Renvoi (9o5)
32 CLUNET 4o . Finally, the extensive
treatise of Laini condemning the doctrine appeared in four successive years, La Thuorie
du Renvoi (19o6) 2 DARRAs 6o5; (907) 3 id. 43; (1908) 4 id. 729; (igog) 5 id. 12.
The following year the French Court of Cassation rejected an appeal seeking to have
renvoi abandoned. Hermann contra Souli6, Cour de Cassation, March I, 1910, 37
CLuNEr 888. This decision was roundly scored by Pillet, Contre la Doctrine du Renvoi (1913) 9 DARRAs 5. Finally in the case of Guez contra Ben Attar, Cour de Cassation, Nov. 7, 1933, Dalloz Recueil Hebdomadaire de Jurisprudence, 1933 I. 570 (1935)
62 CLUNET 88, the jurisprudence was fixed with seeming finality. The court even employed the word renvoi formally in its decision, thus indicating that there is little chance
of its yielding to the critics of the doctrine. Nevertheless the French die hard. See
criticism of renvoi in Perroud, Encore la Question dit Renvoi (1937) 64 CLUNET 492.
Niboyet seems to have yielded, though not without gloomy forebodings. Note (1936)
31 DARRAs 155. The position of the Court of Cassation is defended by Pigeonni&re,
Observationssur la Question du Renvoi (1924) 51 CLUNET 877. See also I ARmINJON,
PRtCIS DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVL (2d ed. 1927) 149 et seq.; Le Renvoi (I922-23)
18 DARRAS 565.
In England the doctrine of renvoi has been hammered incessantly. BATE, NOTES
ON THE DOCTRINE OF RENVOI (1904) ; Abbot, Is the Renvoi a Part of the Common
Law? (19o8) 24 L. Q. REv. 133; BATY, POLARIZED LAW (1914) 115; Pollock, The
'Renvoi' in New York (1920) 36 L. Q. Ray. 91; Falconbridge, Renvoi and Succession
to Movables (193o) 46 L. Q. REv. 465; (93)
47 id. 271; CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1938) 48. Yet the English courts adhere to their peculiar form
of the doctrine. See infra note 21. "The English judges and scholars, however, seem
to be tending to accept the doctrine." Beale, The Conflict of Laws, x886-1936 (937)
50 HARv. L. Rav. 887, 890.
The American position is also succinctly stated by Beale. "American scholars
have, almost without exception, rejected the doctrine as having no place in our law. .. ."
Id. at 889.

See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)

§ 7, comment d.

The only

American decision to come to my attention that expressly ruled upon renvoi rejected it.
In re Tallmadge, IO9 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp. 336 (Surr. Ct. 1919).
17. Supra note 16.
I8. BENTWICH, THE LAW OF THE DOMICiLE IN ITS RELATION TO SUCCESSION
(IgII) i8o, i8r; DIcEy, CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed. I927) app. n. I; WESTLAKE, Op. Cit.
supra note 13, at 25 et seq.; Bentwich, Recent Application of the Renvoi in Matters of
PersonalStatus (1936) 14 CAN. B. REV. 379.
19. Supra note 16.
20. Art. 27, INTRODUCTORY ACT, Civ. Cona. LEWALD, DAS DEUTSCHE INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT (1931), is opposed to renvoi. For references to the position of

other foreign countries on this question, see LORENZEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 52;
POTU, LA QUESTION DU RENVOI EN DRoiT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (1913); Kahn, Abhandlungen aus demn internationalenPrivatrecht (1899) 40 JHERINGS JAHRBuCHER I, 56,
n. I; Lorenzen, supra note 4, IO CoL. L. REv. at 327; Philonenko, La Thiorie du Renvoi quant d la Loi Applicable a la Capacitj des Personnes dans le Projet de Code de
Droit Internationalde l'Andrique Latine (1928) 55 CLUNET 315. Note (1926) 36 YALE
L. J. 114.
21. I do not include as a separate method, the procedure adopted by the English
courts. They interpret their conflicts rule to require the judge to dispose of the case
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The majority of law writers are in agreement that one who seeks
to take the second position is inevitably forced back upon the third
position. Their argument in effect is as follows. The American conflicts rule refers the judge either to French internal law solely or to
what they call the whole of relevant French law including the conflicts
rule. If the reference is to French internal law solely, we have the
situation set forth under number i. If, on the contrary, the reference
is to the whole French law, then in all consistency, they say, the French
conflicts rule must refer the matter to the whole American law, which
in turn, through the operation of the American conflicts rule, must
22
refer the matter to the whole French law, quod est absurduM.

In partial answer, I may say that the use of the phrase "whole of
French law" is confusing. There is no "whole" law to be applied. The
French internal law and the French conflicts rule lead to different
results.23 Hence a choice must be made between them. If in our case
French internal law is chosen, there is an end of the matter. If, on
the contrary, the French conflicts rule is chosen, the further question
arises whether reference is back to American internal law or to the
American conflicts rule. It is at this point that these writers deny that
as would a judge of the foreign country to whose law reference is made. The result
is that if the foreign court would reject renvoi, the English court rejects it and applies
its own law. In re Ross [1930] 1 Ch. 377. If, on the other hand, the foreign court
would have accepted renvoi, the English court accepts it and applies foreign law. In re
Annesley [1926] Ch. 692; In re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259. In the first endition of his
book on PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1935) 138, Professor Cheshire states that this
method made the doctrine of renvoi no longer of practical importance to English lawyers. Yet he concluded his discussion with the statement: "It Would seem that the difficulty of the 'unending circle', which is said to characterize the doctrine of renvoi,
equally afflicts the present doctrine-that an English judge must give the same decision
as the Court of the domicil would give-if the lex domicilii happens to adopt the same
attitude." Id. at 141. In the second edition of the book, op. cit. supra note 16, this
equivocal position is abandoned; and Professor Cheshire contends that the English law
does not recognize the doctrine of renvoi. Id. at 65. Yet this conclusion is a denial of
the necessary implication of the rule in the Annesley, Ross, and Askew cases that the
English judge should apply renvoi or not according to the rule of foreign law. And
the conclusion is directly contrary to what was actually done in the Annesley case.
For a criticism of the English view as represented by the Askew case, see Lewald, Zur
Lehre dier
Riickverweiung irn englischen Recht (1931) 44 NIEmEYER I. The writer
points out that the problem of renvoi is inescapable in the method employed by the
English courts. In re Annesley, supra, is discussed in Note (1926) 25 MIcH. L. REv.
174, and In re Ross, supra, in (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 826, and (1931) 4 CAM_. L. J.
209. The English view is supported by Professor Griswold, stpra note 6.
22. Kahn puts their objection neatly. He says: "The principle of Renvoi is logically unworkable. If the rule adopted by our system is so framed that the foreign
law is to be applied in its totality, including its rules of private international law, it
must also be the import of the foreign rule that our law in its turn is to be applied
in its totality, including our own rules of private international law. The consequence is-that in virtue of the foreign law ours is applied in its totality and in virtue
of ours, the foreign law is again applied in its totality and so on and so on; a logical
'cabinet of mirrors' (Spiegelkabinet)." Kahn, Gesetzeskollisionen (1891) 30 JHERINGS
JAHRBFICHER I, 23, cited in Bates, supra note I5,at 313.
23. The distinction is clearly pointed out by Abbot, Is the Renvoi a Part of the
Common Law? (19o8) 24 L. Q. REv. 133, 135, 136. See also reference to this ambiguity in HARPER AND TAINTOR, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL TECHNIQUE
IN CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 298, n. 48. Professor Griswold used the phrase,
"whole law", being careful, however, to point out the ambiguity in the term. Griswold,
supra note 6, at 1166.
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any question exists. They feel that one who interprets the original
American conflicts rule to refer to the French conflicts rule must in
consistency interpret the French conflicts rule to refer back to the
American conflicts rule. If this is not so, they say, then the lexa domicilii
will not be consistent with the le: patrice. Professor Lorenzen has
stated this view as follows:
"Both must refer either to the internal or material law of the
foreign country or to the foreign law inclusive of its Private
International Law.
'Otherwise,' as the report of the first commission of the Institute of International Law well expressed it, 'one would fall into
the absurdity of having to admit that a legislative provision establishes one thing when it is applied by the national judge and an
entirely different thing when it is applied by a foreign judge; that
a rule of international law changes its meaning, nature, function
as soon as it passes the frontiers of the State in which it was
promulgated!'
There would appear to be no escape in legal theory from this
circle or endless chain of references." 24
I am unable to see how logic has anything to do with this matter.
We are here faced with a reason (doubtless powerful enough) why
rules of private international law should be uniform; but if in fact they
are different, there is no breach of logical consistency. Moreover, in
the renvoi situation there is really only one judge involved, namely, the
judge of the court seised of the case; and the rule of law which he
must explicate before applying it is not a rule of foreign law but a
domestic rule whose purpose is to resolve a conflict. In other words
according to the renvoi doctrine, a French judge faced with our hypothetical case would apply French internal law while an American judge
in the same situation would apply American internal law. Is this any
less consistent than requiring the French judge in the given situation
to apply American internal law and the American judge to apply French
internal law? Each theory arrives at a result as consistent as the other.
Therefore, it is difficult for me to understand why the American conflicts rule may refer to French internal law (as these writers say it
does), but a supposed French conflicts rule may not refer back to American internal law.
Renvoi Exceptions
The opponents of the doctrine of renvoi have accepted it in certain
types of cases. These may be indicated briefly as follows:
i. International conventions among nations having different rules
of the conflict of laws.
24. Lorenzen, supra note 4, 10 COL. L. REv. at 198.
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2. Certain cases involving the validity of marriage or divorce
where hardship would result if the doctrine were not followed.
3. Rules governing the disposition of immovable property.23
These are rather important exceptions; and nothing but sheer
necessity, I suppose, could induce writers on private international law
to apply to these cases a doctrine which they are convinced involves a
formal fallacy in logic. 20 Yet I am unable to see how these writers
can make such a concession and still maintain their argument that renvoi
inevitably leads to a circulus inextricabilis. If they can extricate themselves from the circle when the subject matter is immovable property,
may not others do as much with movable property? Are international
conventions, marriage and real property dispensed from the laws of
logic? Some people would answer "yes" most emphatically, but they
would have in mind defiance rather than dispensation, I suppose.
If those opposed to renvoi can abide erroneous reasoning in these
special instances, why not in the general case? One may not cry paradox, unless his own house of logic is in order. And in the realn of
logic, it is no defense for these writers to say that another's error is
worse than their own since theirs is the same kind of error. They
have no exclusive license to temper logic with faith.
Logic and Vicious Circles 27
We have noted that all parties seem to agree that renvoi involves
a vicious circle or endless chain of references, the vast majority condemning it because of this defect (among others), the rest accepting
it in spite of the difficulty. The affair has passed into the field of
witticism, with the honors, as might be supposed, favoring the opponents of the theory. 28 As has already been said, the writer contends
that the ordinary doctrine of renvoi does not involve a vicious circle,
nor indeed any logical difficulty whatever.
One of the most persistent problems in the history of logic is the
problem of circular definitions. Not all circular definitions are vicious,
25. Condensed from Lorenzen,
mENT, CoNFLicT OF LAWS (1934)

supra note 4, 27 YALE L. J. at 529-531. RESTATE§ 8, admits renvoi in questions of title to land and

the validity of a decree of divorce.
26. For a criticism of the position which accepts renvoi in certain situations only,
see Note (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 114.
27. References to mathematical and logical literature on the subject of this section
will be very sparing inasmuch as this literature is not of general interest to the legal
profession. The writer likewise wishes to avoid the present controversies centering
about the nature of self-referring propositions. This means that the conclusions here
reached do not depend for their validity upon logical theory but upon the principles of
legal analsyis. The use of logical materials is only for the purpose of illustration. Those
who wish to explore the recent literature of this subject are referred to A BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF PHILOSOPHy (933-36), published by Journal of Philosophy, New York, and INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY (1937), published by Librairie Philosophique
J. Vrin, Paris.
28. Griswold, supra note 6, at 1167, n. 8.
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of course, because viciousness involves a value judgment, and such judgment must refer ultimately to the purpose for which the circle was
originally described. In a closed deductive system, for example, it may
be logically necessary that the elements of the system be defined in
terms of one another. Manifestly, however, since it is the purpose of
a choice of laws rule to designate to the judge which law to use in deciding a case, a circle which defeats choice on rational grounds is
vicious.
Vicious circles which involve simple circular definitions are easy
to detect and give rise to little difficulty. But if the circle is concealed,
one often finds it hard to discover what screw is loose in the logical
conundrum. Let us consider for a moment a few familiar examples
of these brain twisters prior to an attempt to generalize the problem
they present.
The following paradox 29 was a favorite with Bishop Taylor who
used it to point the moral vanitas vanitatum: A man who had been
long accustomed to put implicit faith in his dreams, one night dreanit
that all dreams are vain. This was most distressing; for if all dreams
are vain (thought the dreamer), then my present dream is likewise vain.
Therefore it may not be believed. Therefore faith in dreams is restored. Therefore my present dream is trustworthy. Therefore dreams
are vain ...
Take another well known example. Epimenides once had occasion
to remark "All Cretans are liars." No one was disturbed until a chance
acquaintance happened to remember that Epimenides was himself a
Cretan. Now, if all Cretans are liars and if Epimenides is a Cretan,
then, per syllogism, Epimenides is a liar. Therefore Cretans are honest.
So is Epimenides. He must be believed when he says that Cretans are
liars. And as he himself is a Cretan..
Let us consider yet another. Recently, there was a proposal (I
have been told) for the construction of a huge topographical map of
the United States to be made exactly to scale and to be erected on the
site of an entire county (say Pecos in the State of Texas). Rivers,
mountains and plains were to be accurately represented. Every state,
county, town and village was to have its place. Of course, Pecos county
would be represented. It would take the form of a much reduced
topographic map of the United States since there would be no part of
Pecos county which would not be map. One of the most interesting features of this miniature map of the United States would be
an almost microscopic reproduction of Pecos county, Texas, which upon
minute examination would turn out to be an infinitesimally small, yet
complete, topographic map of the United States, one of whose .
29. Quoted by

SmITH, HOW THE MIND FALLs INTO ERROR (1923) 12.
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Finally, there is our own problem which is much the same as the
others: An American conflicts rule which refers to a French conflicts
rule which refers to an American conflicts rule which refers to a French
conflicts rule.
The above are examples of paradoxes arising from self-referring
propositions, or self-including classes. In each instance the class or
the proposition contains itself as part of itself. The present dream
includes itself by referring to all dreams which include the present
dream. The Cretan liar includes himself when he says all Cretans are
liars. Pecos county includes itself by including the United States. The
American conflicts rule includes itself by including the French rule
which includes the American rule.
Not all of the above paradoxes are of the same type, nor are they
to be resolved in the same manner. However, in dealing with them,
logicians find themselves returning to a kind of prototype which is
simple to state and yet which possesses all the difficulties one could
desire. It is the bare statement: This propositionis false. If one denies
it, the result is: this proposition is false is false. Ergo, it seems, this
proposition is true. Deny it again by saying this. proposition is false
is false is false, and the result appears to be: this proposition is false.
Continue by denying it thrice: it's true. Now four times: it's false.
And so on, in saecda saeculorum.
The scholastic resolution of this paradox is incorporated in the
maxim pars propositionisnon potest supponere pro toto.80 This is not
a solution of the problem, of course, but is merely another way of stating it. The scholastics do not show why a part of a proposition cannot be posited for the whole. They merely indicate that one who does
so invites logical disaster.
Circular statements, whether vicious or otherwise, have long received the close attention of logicians and mathematicians; and the history of logic is scattered with the d6bris of systems designed to avoid
the difficulties these statements engender. What to do with propositions of this type-often called self-referring or exceptive propositions
-is still a hotly debated subject in contemporary logic. It would be
out of place for us to attempt to examine the merits of that controversy. However, pending the final outcome, we are perfectly justified in barring as illegitimate all circular definitions. That is to say,
we may take it as a postulate of legal science that circular definitions
are illegitimate, and insist that all who desire to go behind this fundamental assumption confine their activities to another field of intellectual
discipline, to wit, logic. As Kelsen postulates for legal science, the
existence of the state, refusing to allow anyone in law to challenge the
validity of this legal fact, so may we postulate for private international
30. GUTHRXE, PARADOXES OF MR. RussEr.. (1915) 6.
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law a prohibition against circular definitions in determining choice of
law.
In their famous treatise on mathematical logic, Whitehead and
Russell 3' were faced with the necessity of solving the problems raised
by self-referring propositions. Their way out of the difficulty was to
postulate as invalid those propositions which involved vicious circles,
and those classes which were composed of illegitimate totalities, i. e.,
self-including classes. "The principle," they said, "which enables us
to avoid illegitimate totalities may be stated as follows:
"'Whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the
collection'; or, conversely: 'If, provided a certain collection had a
total, it would have members only definable in terms of that total,
then the said collection has no total.' We shall call this the
'vicious-circle principle,' because it enables us to avoid the vicious
circles involved in the assumption of illegitimate totalities

. . .

the

imaginary sceptic, who asserts that he knows nothing, and is refuted by being asked if he knows that he knows nothing, hasasserted nonsense, and has been fallaciously refuted by an argument which involves a vicious-circle fallacy. In order that the
sceptic's assertion may become significant, it is necessary to place
some limitation upon the things of which he is asserting his
ignorance, because the things of which it is possible to be ignorant
form an illegitimate totality. But as soon as a suitable limitation
has been placed by him upon the collection of propositions of
which he is asserting his ignorance, the proposition that he is
ignorant of every member of this collection must not itself be
one of the collection." 32
The same principle with respect to class inclusion is elsewhere
stated by Russell as follows:
"Classes are logical fictions, and a statement which appears to
be about a class will only be significant if it is capable of translation into a form in which no mention is made of the class. This
places a limitation upon the ways in which what are nominally,
though not really, names for classes can occur significantly: a sentence or set of symbols in which such psuedo-names occur in
wrong ways is not false, but strictly devoid of meaning. The supposition that a class is, or that it is not, a member of itself, is
meaningless in just that way."

33

Strangely enough, Whitehead and Russell regard their analysis as
a solution of the difficulty. They postulate their trouble away. However, it should be borne in mind that the method of postulation does
not solve anything. It is a self-conscious limitation of one's sphere of
activity. In fact the solution advanced by Whitehead and Russell is
31. PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (2d ed. 1927).
32. I id.at 37-38.
33. RUSSELL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY (19I1) 137.
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strikingly similar to the scholastic maxim pars propositionis non potest
supponere pro toto stated as a postulate. 34 Be that as it may, it is
entirely legitimate for lawyers to postulate where it would be illegitimate for a logician to do the same thing. Our purpose is to avoid
contradiction, not necessarily to resolve it, the resolution of generalized
forms of contradiction being the business of logic and not of law.
There is one form of circular statement which the mathematician
or logician would not necessarily regard as vicious, but which for the
lawyer would be quite illegitimate. That is an infinite regress of definitions.3 5 Mathematicians and logicians are entirely at home with infinite arrays, only some of which they regard as illegitimate. Lawyers,
on the contrary, develop rules, not for the purpose of generating infinite
series, but in order to settle cases. Hence, what might be a perfectly
adequate solution of the renvoi doctrine for a logician would help the
lawyer not at all.
For example, a logician might offer the following as a solution of
the problem of renvoi, his sole aim being to avoid self-referring
propositions.
i. An American rule of conflict of laws of the first order directs
the disposition of the case according to the provisions of foreign law.
2. If under the circumstances obtaining in (i) foreign law would
have directed the disposition of a similar case according to the provisions of American law, then an American rule of conflict of laws of
the second order directs the disposition' of the case according to the
provisions of domestic law.
3. Under the circumstances obtaining in (2), an American rule
of the conflict of laws of the third order directs disposition according
to foreign law.
4. Under the circumstances obtaining in (3), an American rule of
the conflict of laws of the fourth order directs disposition according
to domestic law. And so on.
In other words, for the purposes of logic, we could assume that
our law provides us with an infinity of rules of conflict of choice of
law, to wit: a rule of conflict, a rule of conflict of conflict,3 6 a rule of

conflict of conflict of conflict, etc. No rule would contain any other
since each rule would be directed to a different subject and each rule
would be of a different logical order. The solution for logic would
34. GUTHRIE, op. cit. supra note 30, cited in SmITH, op. cit. supra note 29, at 15.
35. See L IS AND LANGFORD, SymSoLIc LoGic (1932) 438 et seq., cited in Gris-wold, spra note 6, at 1167, n. 8.
36. Two recent writers have analyzed renvoi as a rule of this sort. "The renvoi is
thus in the nature of a super conflict of laws rule-conflict of conflict of laws. It is a
rule of conflict of laws on a higher logical level." HARPER AND TAiNTOR, op. cit.
supra note 23, at 223.
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merely be to indicate the infinitely expanding nature of the series thus
generated. Obviously, such a result would be just as vicious for lawyers
as though it contained a true logical fallacy. In other words, infinite
regress of definition is no more helpful to us than a true vicious circle.
Renvoi Not a Vicious Circle
I do not believe that the ordinary doctrine of renvoi involves either
a vicious circle or an infinite regress of definitions. If it did, of course,
either would be enough to invalidate it.
Let us revert for a moment to our friend Smith who died in Paris.
According to American law his domicile at death was France. According to French law the domicile was American. If an American court
were to apply the ordinary doctrine of renvoi, it would be deemed to
have referred the matter to French law, which in turn would be deemed
to have returned the matter to American law. The American court
would thereupon have accepted the renvoi and would apply its own law
to the distribution of the estate.
As was said at the outset, one of the most serious objections to
this theory has always been the assumption that it does involve some
form of vicious circular or expanding statement. That is, after the
renvoi from France, ordaining, it is said, the application of American
law, that latter law ordains a second renvoi to France, which to be
consistent must direct a third renvoi to America, and so on ad infinitum.
It is obvious that, if reference and counter reference are solely to
conflict rules, infinite recurrence will set in. X is defined in terms of
Y, and Y is defined in terms of X. Hence, at this stage of the game
some indefinable must be substituted for either X or Y. The important question here is the following: When must reference cease? How
long may substitution be postponed?
One may define X in terms of Y and Y in terms of X, for this
merely makes X and Y equivalent. But since an infinite regress is to
be escaped, the terms must be given meaning at this point. For if X
is defined once more in terms of Y7, then X is included in the definition
of X as a part of itself. To put the matter otherwise: If I say X is
Y and Y is X and then stop, what you expect of me next is to substitute some other meaning for X or for Y. But if I say X is 37, and
Y is X, and X is 37, the only thing you expect next of me is to say
"and so on", for I have indicated all the elements of an infinite series.
It should be clear, therefore, that reference from law to law must
stop before the series becomes capable of infinite expansion, or, if we
think in terms of Russell's principle, before the class includes itself as
a member. The theoretical, although not the practical, objection to
starting renvoi has always been the claim that there is no sound theoreti-
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cal reason for stopping.17 This position has led some to assert that the
court seised of the case may not apply foreign law at all where the
possibility of reference back exists, but must apply its own internal
law immediately. It has led others to say that reference to foreign law
means reference to foreign internal law, necessarily excluding the foreign conflict of laws rule.38 Unquestionably, each of these positions
avoids the danger of infinite regress or vicious circle. Can we not
have one reference back to American law in our chosen case without
risking a vicious circle? May there not be one renvoi without danger
of an illegitimate totality? The answer is that we may have one
such reference, provided that the reference back is to American internal law. American law refers the matter to French law, and the
French law refers it back to American internal law where it stops.
There is no circle here at all, vicious or otherwise. We have merely
a round-trip, so to speak. If, however, the reference back were to
American conflict rules and American law may once more refer the
matter back to French law, we should have a true case of a vicious circle
or an infinite regress; for French law at this stage of the game would
be defined as a class composed of American law and French law.
Therefore, the American court not only can, but must, stop at the second reference, although it need not do so before the point is reached.
I know that many readers will feel that this method of procedure
is like lifting oneself by one's bootstraps. We seem to be justifying a
rather patent flight from a difficulty by erecting it to the dignity of a
postulate. We make it a matter of principle to stop before we are
hurt. But the question may still persist: granted we are going to be
hurt, how can we stop? I say this in answer: to reduce a theoretical
position to contradiction must always lead to its abandonment. Therefore, our logical analysis shows us that if we desire a practicable result
(one free from a vicious circle) the reference back must be to internal
law. It also shows us that the reference back may take place, provided
reference back is to internal law. We must stop as soon as contradiction is brought to light; but when this takes place we need yield only
37. As a recent commentator put it, "having once got on the renvoi merry-go-round
there is no logical reason why the forum should get off at this point rather than any
other."

(1937)

30 HARV. L. REv. 1119, 1159.

38. "But, logically, why should the inquiry stop with the internal law of New
York on the reference from the French law? Why, indeed, should the reference be to
the internal law of New York and not to its conflict-of-laws rule again? In the first
instance, the New York court, in seeking to apply the French law, was, by hypothesis,
referred to the French conflict-of-laws rule instead of its internal laws. Why not the
same character of reference upon the return? It is clear that the logical result of this
reference back and forth to the conflict-of-laws rule of the respective countries would
be an indefinite oscillation between the two laws." Per Winthrop, Ref., In re Tallmadge, iog Misc. 696, 709, 18 N. Y. Supp. 336, 344 (Surr. Ct. i919). Should not it
be at least equally clear that the reason why the reference from the French law should

be to the New York internal law is the laudable purpose of avoiding "indefinite oscillation between the two laws"? Why persist in indulging ones all too human penchant

for paradox?
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so much as is necessary. To repeat, abandonment need not take place
until all the elements of contradiction are made out. In fact, if the
position is given up before that point is reached, the reason must be
something other than consistency. In other words we must stop reference and counter-reference before any law includes itself as a sub-class,
but there is no logical necessity for a prior halt.
What then of those who stop with the single reference, who apply
the foreign internal law after having excluded the rule of counterreference? If they do this because of fear of an infinite regress, their
fear is groundless. If they venture to refer, there is no logical reason
against "accepting renvoi", as the picturesque phrase goes.
A statement of the doctrine of renvoi which avoids logical difficulty may now be formulated as follows:
The French conflict of laws rule refers the court to all pertinent American law including pertinent conflict of laws rules. One
of these conflict of laws rules refers the court back to pertinent
French law not including the rule of law by which the first reference was made.
I see no logical difficulty in such an account of a judicial proceeding. This is, in essence, the rule of law that has been applied by the
French courts for over half a century. It so happens that I do not
agree with the French courts when they conceive the existence of an
American rule of conflicts relating to causes of which a foreign court
is seised. However, this is at most a misapprehension of law (or fact)
and not an error in logic. If, in the above illustration, the French
courts conceived that the American law referred the matter to French
conflict of laws, then logical trouble would surely ensue. Hence, from
the point of view of logic, if reference back is resorted to, it must be
reference back to internal law and not to conflict rules.
Weiterverweisung
So far, we have been concerned only with the problem of reference
back and forth between the law of two states. It sometimes happens
that the law of three or more states must be consulted in determining
the choice of law. So long as the "reference on" (Weiterverweisung) 8 9
is to a different system of law each time, no logical problem presents
itself. The court that is so unfortunate as to be faced with such a case
must follow the trail as best it may, determining its choices, whether
internal law or conflicts rule, on juridical grounds alone. If, however,
there occurs somewhere in the series a true renvoi or reference back
(Riickverweisung) to a system of law already included in the chain of
references, then the same considerations apply as obtained in a simple
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reference between two states. The logical objection to renvoi has no
more validity where the case involves three or more states than where
the law of only two states is in issue.
Conclusion
The reader must have observed the painful care which the writer
has had to take in order to state his paradoxes. The least slip in
the statement of propositions ostensibly self-referring will break the
charmed circle. This, of course, is usually true of logical fallacies.
They are extremely hard to put. Correspondingly, it is also difficult
to be sure that we have not fallen into fallacy. This is why renvoi has
always been a logical ghost not easy to lay; and the value of the foregoing analysis, if any it have, lies in its making precise the logical
difficulties in the doctrine.
When reference back is resorted to, the analysis indicates that
there will be no logical difficulty if the reference is back to internal law.
On the other hand, reference back to the conflicts rule lands us on the
logical merry-go-round. The immediate practical result of this analysis is
that the logical kinks in the ordinary doctrine of renvoi can be ignored.
In every such instance either the internal law of the forum or foreign
internal law may be applied to the case so far as logic is concerned.
Thus the whole field of choice of law is freed from the logical bugbear
that has so long haunted it; and as has already been said, juridical
rather than logical considerations should determine one's attitude
toward the doctrine.
39. Supra note 15.

